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I would like to give an account of the mental, the 
mind and the body. 
To begin, let us consider some of the differences 
between objects and activities. An object has spatial 
extension and can exist at an instant of time. Objects are 
considered to have properties whose spatio-temporal 
conjunction is commonly thought to define what the object 
is. No temporal extension seems to be necessary for the 
object to be what it is. The object can exist at an instant. 
Similarly, the object can remain through time what it is, 
without changing any of the properties commonly thought 
to be internal to it.  
In contrast, an activity does not have spatial 
extension at an instant, though the object performing the 
activity does. Yet the activity necessarily has temporal 
extension. There is no activity at an instant. As a 
consequent, the continuance of the activity through time 
requires continuance in the change that is the activity. 
To illustrate, consider a clarinet. As an object it has 
spatial extension, even at an instant of time. It may be 
considered as a composite of its properties: It may be 
black, of such and such weight and shape. We can 
consider the weight apart from the color and may consider 
the clarinet to be the composite of its properties. It can 
both exist at an instant of time and can continue to exist 
through time with no change in its internal properties. 
Now consider the same clarinet involved in the 
activity of sounding middle C. The sounding of middle C is 
an activity. While we may locate where the sounding 
originates, the sounding itself is more disperse. But more 
importantly, for our purposes, the sounding necessarily 
requires temporal extension. There is no such thing as an 
instant of the sounding of middle C. The origin of the 
necessity of this temporal extension is the fact that the 
sounding of middle C requires an alteration of one thing, 
the wave form and such alternation necessarily exists only 
through temporal extension. Similarly, if  the sounding of 
middle C is to continue, the sounding of middle C must 
continually be recreated. The continuance of the sounding 
of middle C is the continuance of a rate of change. If there 
is no change, there is no rate of change and hence no 
continuance of a rate of change. 
Now let us consider the traditional mind−body 
problem. First let us consider the body, or, as medical 
science has brought us to focus on, the brain. The brain is 
an object. As such it necessarily has spatial extension; and 
the collection of properties at the specified spatial-location 
may be deemed to comprise a specific brain. Both these 
commonly considered properties and the brain these 
properties are taken to comprise can as well exist at an 
instant. The brain as an object may remain what it is 
without change in at least some commonly considered 
properties such as size and mass. 
Now we come to the more puzzling of the two, the 
mind. What is the mind? A traditional approach considers 
the mind as a distinct type of substance having properties 
in much the same way that ordinary physical objects have 
properties. As such the mind can exist at an instant of 
time. Yet when we consider the location and spatial 
extension of the mind, we are puzzled. Traditionally the 
mind is conceived as a depository for feelings, thoughts, 
and sensations, entities whose nature is as problematic as 
the mind which allegedly contains them.   
Now may I suggest that some of the puzzlement 
that surrounds this conception of the mind as a depository 
object might be dissolved, in ways advanced by 
Wittgenstein, if we consider the mind not as an unusual 
type of object, but instead as an activity. Evidence that we 
should take the mind in this way comes from the seemingly 
necessary temporal extension of all that we are directly of 
aware of in regard to the mind and from the fact that to 
maintain what is mental seems to require its continual 
reconstruction. 
Take, for example, the mental activity of thinking: 
“Freedom is desired by all who have ever known it.” It does 
not seem possible to think this in an instant. We may think 
it quickly, but not instantly. Similarly, if we wish to continue 
to think this, we cannot think it once and hold the thought, 
but must continually be reconstructing the same thought 
over and over again. 
In short, it seems that in thinking: “Freedom is 
desired by all who have ever known it,” we seem to be 
doing something similar to what the clarinet does in 
continuing the sounding of middle C. 
What we have illustrated with thinking seems as 
well the case with feeling and sensing. Feeling happy does 
not seem possible at an instant and if we should continue 
feeling happy it seems that the feeling is continuously 
being renewed. It is similar with sensing cold. There seems 
to be no instant of sensing cold; and to continue in the 
sensing of cold, it seems the sensing of cold need be 
continually renewed. 
Now we have so far been considering how 
emotion, thought and sensation, objects commonly thought 
to be in something are actually activities. But what are they 
activities of? Our feeling, thinking and sensing is clearly 
manifest in our experience. It appears each is an activity. 
But it is not clear what performing or causing the activity.  
Consider a similar situation. We have in a room a 
fine quality stereo system and a friend who has brought his 
clarinet as well as a recording of the friend playing the 
clarinet. If we are in another room, we may hear the 
sounding of a clarinet, but not be able to determine the 
source of the sounding. Is the sounding coming from the 
stereo system or from the clarinet? From our experience in 
the room where we are, we cannot tell. 
With manifest mental activity, what are some 
entities that could host or cause the manifest mental 
activity? One possibility is that nothing has or causes the 
manifest mental activity. The activity simply is self-existent 
in that it exists without being the activity of anything else or 
being caused by anything else. An analogue for this 
possibility may be found in the wave activity that is light. At 
one point it was considered that light waves must be 
propagated in some medium in much the same way that 
ocean waves must be propagated in ocean water. Now it 
seems reasonable to consider light waves being 
propagated through a vacuum. Perhaps manifest mental 
activity has no underlying substance of any type. We may 
call this unsubstantiated manifest mental activity, 
intelligence. So understood, intelligence is understood 
  83
more as an activity like energy rather than as a substance 
like physical matter. 
A second possibility is to consider mental activity 
either to be the mind itself, or to be caused by a mind. Of 
course the problem is what is a mind? The only clear and 
unproblematic aspect of the description of the mind is that 
it is not composed of physical matter. If it is substance, but 
not physical matter, what is it? It could be considered as 
material, but more refined matter than physical matter 
which renders it unobservable, but still material. A scientific 
analogue to this account might be a force field which has 
spatial extension, but is not observable like spatially 
extended physical objects. 
Some tradition claims mind is immaterial 
substance, perhaps reflecting a similarity to Platonic forms. 
However, the coherence of the very concept of immaterial 
substance is not apparent. Apart from that, however, it 
seems structurally deficient in that it presents a genus, but 
only a negative differentia. It is akin to defining man not as 
a rational animal, but as a non-kangaroo animal. Until the 
differentia becomes affirmative, it is not clear that even if 
we could perceive every type of thing in the universe, we 
would know we were perceiving mind, if in fact we were 
perceiving mind. 
In addition to the composition of the mind, it is 
useful to determine the capacity of the mind. Most 
accounts will attribute to the mind the capacity to feel, 
intend, think and sense its sensations. More problematic is 
whether the mind, by itself, can perceive. Considering the 
mind to be capable of perception brings it closer to its 
historical antecedent the spirit, found in the history and 
philosophy of religion. Philosophers may wish to grant the 
extension because it may conceptually permit one of few 
pertinent empirical tests relevant to the mind−body 
problem. 
Feeling, intending, thinking and sensing its own 
sensations are all internal to the mind. All knowledge that 
comes from these activities is about the mind, not that 
which is other than the mind. Perceiving, however, is 
different. Perception is to give us knowledge about what is 
other than the mind. Now how does this permit an 
empirical test relevant to the mind−body question? While 
there are many collected accounts of near death 
experiences in which people report perception while 
outside their body, most of what is reported could be 
explained in a materialistic model. However, the 
acquisition of independently confirmable information that 
would not have been available to the body in its observed 
location would be strong support for the existence of the 
mind as a perceiving entity, independent of the body.  
Another possible entity that could be the place or 
cause of mental activity is the brain. Suppose the brain 
changed shape continuously and the various formations 
were found to correlate in a one-to-one function with 
various respective feelings, thoughts or sensations. If the 
shape alternation could be detected to occur only before 
the correlated mental activity, then it would seem normal to 
consider the brain transformation to be the cause of the 
correlated mental activity. If the mental activity were found 
to occur only prior to the brain shape transformation, then 
it would seem normal to consider the mental activity to be 
the cause of the correlated brain transformation. If they 
were simultaneous changes, then it would seem they were 
in some sense identical, or at least that one was an aspect 
of the other. 
If we start a causal chain that results in a brain 
shape transformation and there followed a mental activity 
transformation, then this would suggest that the brain 
transformation caused the mental activity transformation. 
At times this seems to occur. 
Now suppose we are thinking, “Freedom is desired 
by all who have ever known it.” And then we wonder, has 
anyone ever not known it? We reflect on the matter and 
then think, from early childhood experiences all have 
known some degree of freedom and then conclude all 
desire freedom. 
Now the problem is this: In the mental activity, 
there is a cognitive relationship between the first thought, 
the second thought and what is eventually concluded. To 
each of the respective thoughts, suppose there is identified 
its respective brain shape change. If the respective brain 
state transformation is considered to cause its correlated 
mental activity, how are we to understand what appears 
prima facie to be a logical relationship among successive 
mental activity when each thought is deemed to be caused 
by a succession of brain shape transformations that prima 
facie appears to be devoid of cognitive content and hence 
void of logical relationship? 
It would seem that any fully adequate account of 
the brain as the object of activity responsible for manifest 
mental activity, must not only establish the sequential 
correlation but also be able to trace the causal sequence 
between the brain shape transformation activity and the 
mental activity and account for what seems to be logically 
guided mental activity in terms of physical processes 
guided by laws of forces rather than laws of inference. 
In the example just considered, the activity of the 
brain postulated to correlate with mental activity was 
transformation of shape. But of course, no such 
transformation exists.  
Instead the more reasonable correlate to mental 
activity is the electrical and chemical activity in the brain. 
This complicates the model considerably. If there were 
simple brain shape transformations corresponding to 
various mental activity, then it would seem there would be 
no space for non-material postulations, making the 
mind−body purely dichotomous between the material and 
the nonmaterial. But realizing that the manifest mental is 
an activity and finding only chemical and electrical activity 
in the brain as possible correlates does not sustain the 
material/non-material dichotomy. Electrical activity as 
energy transfer is especially problematic. A simple 
mechanistic material model of the brain seems to leave no 
space for the immaterial; but the electro-dynamic model 
does. Not only is energy immaterial, but some of the very 
principles by which it conforms seem to re-infuse the 
mental-like conceptions materialists may have hoped the 
study of the brain would exorcise. These come not only in 
the various conceptions of the nature of electrical activity 
but also in the quantum mechanical principles that replace 
mechanical determinism with probability and, under some 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, the intentional 
activity of measurement or perception as the creator of 
material reality, suggesting the material world is a function 
of its being perceived. 
In conclusion, it seems that what is manifest is 
mental activity rather than an object, state of an object or 
substance. As an activity, it is difficult to see how mental 
activity could be correlated either to an entity or a state of 
an entity, be it mind or brain. As an activity, be it an activity 
of mind or electrical activity in the brain, it seems 
increasingly difficult to adequately render the self in terms 
congruent with deterministic materialism. In fact, realizing 
that the mental is an activity, not an object, may cause us 
to find the mind−body problem less interesting because the 
mental, considered as an activity, does not seem to fit so 
well the long assumed parallel debates about materialism 
and determinism. 
 
